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While concepts such as ‘partnership’ are central to the terminology of private–public
mix (PPM), little attention has been paid to how social relations are negotiated among
the diverse actors responsible for implementing these inter-sectoral arrangements.
India’s Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme (RNTCP) has used
intermediary agents to facilitate the involvement of private providers in the expansion
of Directly Observed Therapy, Short-Course (DOTS). We examine the roles of
tuberculosis health visitors (TB HVs) in mediating working relationships among
private providers, programme staff and patients that underpin a PPM-DOTS launched
by the RNTCP in western Maharashtra. In addition to observations and informal
interactions with the programme and participating health providers, researchers
conducted in-depth interviews with senior programme officers and eight TB HVs.
Framed by a political discourse of clinical governance, working relationships within
the PPM are structured by the pluralistic context, social and professional hierarchies
and paternalism of health care in India. TB HVs are at the nexus of these relationships,
yet remain undervalued partly because accountability is measured through technical
rather than social outcomes of the ‘partnership’. Close attention to the dynamics of
power relations in working practices within the health system can improve
accountability and sustainability of partnerships.
Keywords: private–public mix; partnerships; tuberculosis control; India;
accountability
Introduction
The WHO-recommended DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-Course) strategy
for tuberculosis (TB) control was launched and expanded in the mid-to-late 1990s
through the Revised National TB Control Programme (RNTCP) in India (RNTCP, 2001).
However, growing evidence confirmed that more than half of India’s TB patients were
likely to seek treatment from a private practitioner (PP) (Kelkar-Khambete et al., 2008;
Uplekar, Pathania, & Raviglione, 2001) and to be treated with non-standardised drug
regimens (Udwadia, Pinto, & Uplekar, 2010). In response, the RNTCP’s second
phase policy document explicitly called for engagement with non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and PPs. Consequently, within the wider transition towards models
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of public–private partnerships (PPP) in the health sector (Uplekar, 2003), the late 1990s
and first half of the new decade saw numerous attempts to involve PPs in the RNTCP
(Ambe et al., 2005; Arora, Sarin, & Lonnroth, 2003). Under the public–private mix for
DOTS (PPM-DOTS) initiative, PPs were encouraged to engage with the RNTCP in a
variety of ways – from referring patients to the public sector for diagnosis to being trained
to work as Directly Observed Treatment (DOT) providers for TB patients registered for
treatment under the programme.
While the experiences of involving PPs in TB care in India were pioneering (Arora
et al., 2003; Murthy, Frieden, Yazdani, & Hreshikesh, 2001), they rested on contested
assumptions about the feasibility and sustainability of working relationships between the
public and the private medical sectors (Dewan et al., 2006). The private medical sector in
India is vast, pluralistic and idiosyncratic in practice. The colonial legacy of public health
policy in India has meant that indigenous traditions have been neglected, resulting in marked
hierarchies within the health system. The attempt to synchronise other medical traditions
under AYUSH1 has had limited success, not least because it has not adequately addressed
the asymmetrical power relations among different medical traditions (Bhardwaj, 2010).
High levels of mistrust and suspicion exist between the public and private sectors (De
Costa, Johansson, & Diwan, 2008; Uplekar et al., 2001; Uplekar, 2003; Vyas, Small, &
DeRiemer, 2003): public sector staff commonly perceives PPs as irrational, profit-
oriented and non-compliant to TB management guidelines. In turn, private sector
practitioners question the fundamental tenets of the DOTS strategy, for example, the
effectiveness of intermittent treatment, the use of sputum examination for TB manage-
ment and the practical implementation of the strategy (Harper, 2009; Vyas et al., 2003).
Limited understanding of each other’s functioning has meant that ‘partnerships’ generally
amounted to one-sided arrangements whereby the public sector took on the lead role of
recruiting, educating and monitoring PPs adherence to the RNTCP without adequate
consideration of PPs’ interests (Lonnroth et al., 2004). Not surprisingly, a review of the
evidence suggested that the endeavour was time and resource intensive, with commitment
from both sides flagging (Mahendradhata, Lambert, Boelaert, & Van der Stuyft, 2007).
Formal suggestions to strengthen the participation of PPs included referral slips, tighter
maintenance of records, as well as the introduction of intermediary agents to improve
communication, build trust and facilitate more effective collaboration (Ambe et al., 2005;
Lonnroth et al., 2004; Pradhan et al., 2011; Rangan et al., 2004).
Although initiatives like the PPM-DOTS have been in place for more than two
decades, little empirical attention has been paid to the social relations among diverse
actors tasked with implementing the often complex formal arrangements envisaged under
such partnerships. In this paper, we describe the working roles and relationships that
underpin PPM-DOTS in western India. Notably, we highlight the role of frontline health
workers – the TB health visitors (TB HVs) – in mediating local terms of ‘partnership’ in a
highly pluralistic and hierarchical health system.
The backdrop for this paper is PPM-DOTS in the RNTCP in Sundernagar
(pseudonym), a highly industrialised township in the State of Maharashtra covering an
area of 171 km2. It represents an unusual example of an initiative that was sustained for
over a decade exclusively with resources from the programme (Pradhan et al., 2011). One
of the reasons for its relative longevity was the programme’s optimal use of human
resources. Under the PPM-DOTS model initiated by the programme officer in
Sundernagar, the local programme trained and enlisted PPs to refer their TB patients to
the RNTCP for DOTS, or to serve as DOT providers themselves in an attempt to improve
coverage of DOTS in areas with scant public health sector facilities. In the initial years,
2 K. Kielmann et al.
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the PPM-DOTS was monitored by medical officers (MOs) and para-medical supervisors.
Periodic assessment of the PPM-DOTS initiative showed encouraging results in terms of
promoting earlier referrals of patients who sought treatment from PPs involved in the
PPM-DOTS as opposed to those not involved in the initiative. As the number of
participating PPs increased, and referrals from the enlisted PPs became more erratic and
less reliable, the need for additional capacity for monitoring was recognised (Pradhan
et al., 2011). To this purpose, the City TB Officer (CTO) in Sundernagar decided to enlist
TB HVs,2 contractual field staff normally responsible for outreach activities, to recruit
PPs for the programme and monitor those who became affiliated with the programme.
The extended role for TB HVs and the relationships they develop with patients, PPs,
programme staff and supervisors form the subject of our analysis in this paper: as active
but hidden links in the PPM-DOTS, the TB HVs offer a unique lens for understanding
how ‘partnerships’ are negotiated and sustained by actors in local health systems
contexts. This emphasis on social relations, and more broadly, the socio-political contexts
in which health systems are embedded, is core to an anthropological approach to medical
systems (Baer, Singer, & Susser, 2003), but remains a fairly recent perspective in the
global health systems literature (Atkinson, 2002; Bloom & Standing, 2008; Freedman,
2005; Gilson, 2003; Gilson et al., 2011). Empirical work on social relations in health
systems has tended to focus narrowly on patient–provider relations, and remains
relatively unexplored in low- and middle-income settings (Ozawa & Sripad, 2013;
Rowe & Calnan, 2006). We aim to contribute to addressing these gaps by embedding our
analysis of TB HVs’ working relationships and their understandings of accountability
both within the clinical governance structures of the RNTCP as well as the broader
organisational culture of the Indian health system within which it operates.
Methodology
Context of study
The CTO of Sundernagar approached an academic NGO based in Pune to collaborate on
an operations research study exploring the factors that motivated PPs’ involvement in the
PPM-DOTS and to test the feasibility of different interventions to strengthen the PPM.
Two of the authors (Vinita Datye and Anagha Pradhan) were employees of the NGO at
the time and had lead roles in conducting the research and interventions in this project. In
addition to the formal data collection conducted as part of the research, Datye and
Pradhan were in regular and close contact with the Sundernagar programme staff over the
course of two years. The frequent opportunities to observe interactions with various
stakeholders in the intervention enhanced researchers’ understanding of how the PPM-
DOTS was implemented on the ground.
Data collection
Together with three research assistants, Datye and Pradhan were involved in a series of
studies that examined the perspectives of different actors within the PPM-DOTS. Prior to
the operations research study, a census conducted by the programme listed 767 PPs in
Sundernagar, including PPs practicing Western biomedicine (allopathy) as well as three of
the alternative medical traditions that make up the Indian health system (Ayurveda,
Homeopathy and Unani). A survey conducted with 497 of these PPs3 examined PPs’
referral practices as well as enablers and barriers to their participation in the PPM-DOTS.
This sample included 164 PP-DOT providers in the programme catchment area. Less than
Global Public Health 3
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one-fifth of the PPs were practising allopaths (14%) while more than half were ayurvedic
practitioners (57%). Findings indicated that although a majority (87%) of the PPs referred
to the RNTCP, only a quarter of these received feedback regarding the diagnosis of the
patients. The PPs suggested that better communication and feedback from the programme
would be important for sustaining the initiative. In order to obtain a more in-depth
understanding of referrals, communication and working relations of the PPM-DOTS in
Sundernagar, semi-structured interviews were conducted with patients and with PPs to
document the experiences of providing and receiving DOT at a PP-DOT centre. Datye
and Pradhan also conducted in-depth interviews with three acting programme officers –
the CTO and the two MOs – as well as with the former CTO who had initiated the PPM-
DOTS in Sundernagar.
In reviewing these sources of data, the TB HVs emerged as crucial intermediaries in
the facilitation of PPM-DOTS. Consequently, the researchers conducted in-depth
interviews with eight of the 11 TB HVs working with the programme at the time4 about
their role in the expansion of the PPM-DOTS, field challenges and suggestions to
overcome these challenges. Interviews were conducted in pairs, after obtaining written
consent from interviewees. All interviews were conducted in Marathi or English with the
help of semi-structured interview guides. This paper draws primarily on the interviews
conducted with TB HVs, but also makes reference to two of the interviews with
programme officers and interviews with PPs.
Data analysis
The in-depth interviews with TB HVs and programme officers were tape recorded,
transcribed and translated where necessary. They were read through several times by the
authors. As a first step, the interviews were manually coded around important themes
explored during the interviews (role in the expansion of the PPM-DOTS, field challenges
and suggestions to overcome these challenges). Further codes, for example, around the
scope, nature and consequences of particular roles for working relationships, were
inductively derived and discussed among the researchers to refine a preliminary code list.
The interview data were managed using the qualitative data management package – Atlas
Ti (AtlasTi 4.2, 1997–2003 The Scientific Software Development Berlin). Frequencies of
the coded data excerpts helped to further revise the code list, for example, by combining
some codes that were too narrow, and breaking down others that were too broad. Three of
the four authors including Datye and Pradhan were involved in developing codes and the
process of coding. The coded data were entered into matrices relating to the four domains
of relationships set out by the framework (Figure 1) in order to examine trends as well as
tensions in the ways these relationships were articulated and experienced.
Conceptual framework
Although their formal visibility is low, the TB HVs are not just part of the ‘organisational
machinery’ of the RNTCP but rather ‘reflective, responsive human beings embedded in
networks of social relations’ (Blaauw, Gilson, Penn-Kekana, & Schneider, 2003, p. 23).
An important strand of recent work on social relations in health systems has centred on
the notion of trust as a crucial element underpinning collaboration among health systems
actors to achieve health outcomes. While the literature emphasises both inter-personal as
well as institutional relations of trust (Gilson, 2003; Rowe & Calnan, 2006), most
empirical work has focused on patient–provider relationships without adequate
4 K. Kielmann et al.
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consideration of the broader context of workforce relationships within which these take
place. A recent review of health systems trust measures confirms that most focus on
relationships among doctors, nurses and patients rather than examining organisational
interactions at the health system and societal level (Ozawa & Sripad, 2013). In order to
map the web of social relations that sustain the Sundernagar PPM-DOTS, we drew on
Newman’s categorisation of public sector relationships in the health system (Newman,
1998; Figure 1). These include: service relationships, i.e. frontline interactions between
health care workers and patients; organisational relationships, i.e. interactions between
managers and workers, between colleagues or between different categories of health
workers; inter-organisational relationships, i.e. relationships with external organisations
such as suppliers, PPs and NGOs; and finally political relationships, referring to the
broader context of relationships between governments and citizens. The framework
highlights the interconnectedness of domains, and specifically of the crucial role of social
relationships within the health system.
We suggest that the Sundernagar PPM-DOTS represents a micro-system that
embodies the full range of these domains. In their interactions with patients, PPs,
programme staff and supervisors, TB HVs are at the intersection of the service,
organisational and inter-organisational relationships as described by Newman. The
working relationships that TB HVs form and sustain as part of their extended role in
the PPM-DOTS involve complex negotiations of social and professional hierarchy,
regulatory frameworks and personalised moral imperatives in TB care. While these
relationships are framed by an overarching political discourse about the accountability of
the RNTCP to patient-citizens, they are also undoubtedly shaped by the organisational
culture of the Indian health system, which in turn reflects wider normative societal values
(Gilson, 2003). In line with these considerations, we adapted Newman’s framework to
structure our analysis in this paper (Figure 2).
Results
Profile of TB HVs
The eight TB HVs varied widely in their qualifications and years of experience (Table 1).
Most of the TB HVs had received practical training related to their tasks ranging from
patient counselling to administrative duties such as monitoring of treatment cards and
Service
relationships
Provider–user 
Inter-organisational
relationships
Provider–contractor
Organisational
relationships
Manager–worker
Political
relationships
State–citizen
• Hierachy / authority
• Market / price
• Network / trust
Types of relationshipsRelationship domains
Figure 1. Relationship domains in the health system.
Note: Original diagram from Newman (1998).
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boxes kept at the private clinics. This training was provided both formally as well as
informally through observations, field visits with TB supervisors and other TB HVs.
Service relationships: TB HVs and patients
Our RNTCP is the only programme where we care for patients. We go after the patients.
None of the other programmes are like this […]Apart from the TB control society, nobody
goes to people’s houses to give tablets, nobody goes to patients’ homes to invite them –
‘please come for treatment’. [Ganesh, male TB HV with one and a half years of experience;
for all quotes words spoken in English have been underlined, quotes within quotes are
italicised]
After patients are diagnosed at a designated microscopy centre, they are assigned an
accessible public or private (managed by a PP) DOT centre. The TB HVs make home
visits to the newly diagnosed patients in a specified catchment area to confirm the
address. When patients are assigned to a PP-DOT provider, TB HVs carry individualised
‘patient-wise’ treatment boxes and introduce the patient to the PP. The PP-DOT provider
looks after the patient’s treatment while the TB HVs cross-check treatment boxes and
cards to identify treatment ‘interrupters’:
Once we are [at the DOT centre] we have only this to do – see the cards, check the box, see if
the card and the box match, is the patient due for follow-up? Is the patient on DOT? [i.e.
regular in his medication-taking] If not then retrieve immediately. [Prashant, three years of
experience]
TB HVs are in close contact with patients diagnosed and initiated on DOTS. While
interactions with patients in clinical settings are to some extent prescribed by programme
guidelines,5 home visits involve a shift of familiar terrain. TB HVs are sensitive to the
patients’ need for confidentiality, and often have to use subtle skills to balance trust with
TB
Health visitors
Service
TB Patients
Inter-
organisational
Private providers
Organisational
Programme
staﬀ/supervisors
Political
RNTCP
TB
‘Community’
•‘Familial’ authority/trust
• Control/deference
• Accountability/trust
Governmentality
Types of relationships
Relationship domains
Figure 2. Relationship domains in PPM-DOTS.
Note: Adapted from Newman (1998).
6 K. Kielmann et al.
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authority, including the need to safeguard the patient’s identity. Shubha describes a home
visit:
If we go to a home, then the neighbours gather around immediately. Then we say that we are
friends or relatives. That is how the patient also understands these people [TB HVs] have
come from the hospital…or even if we go without [advance] notice, we do not identify
ourselves [by saying] that we have come from the hospital. When we go inside the home,
there are no outsiders. It is only then that we tell them that we have come from [name]
hospital. [Shubha, five years of experience]
TB HVs compensate for PP-DOT providers’ inability to counsel the patients at length.
Successful ‘retrieval’ of treatment ‘interrupters’ involves long hours in the field and
occasionally home visits after working hours. Many TB HVs assume a quasi-familial
authority in prescribing advice regarding healthier lifestyles and chiding and cajoling
patients to comply with DOTS. Especially in cases where patients have interrupted or
stopped treatment, TB HVs see it as their obligation to intervene at the household level:
‘We definitely tell their parents or wife, whoever is at home. And we also give them
information about what could happen if he does not take medicines’ (Krishna, five years
of experience). Drastic measures to retrieve defaulting patients may be used occasionally,
as described by Rajesh:
We told the patient: ‘If you don’t take your medicines we will bring the police to your house!’
At that time we took [name of TB HV] there and pretended that he was a policeman. He said:
‘Why aren’t you taking your tablets? Come to the police station.’ He put such pressure on the
patient. After that he [patient] said: ‘Okay sir, I will take the tablets’. First we took him to the
centre and gave him the tablets. Then we told him that [name of TB HV] was not a
policeman: ‘We just pretended he was one for your own good’. [Rajesh, five years of
experience]
While likely to represent a rare instance, Rajesh’s narration of this episode indicates the
level of action deemed justifiable in extreme cases. Yet, exposed to the intimate facets of
Table 1. Profile of TB HVs.
Name
(pseudonyms) Sex
Years of
experience in
Sundernagar Qualifications
1 Shubha F 5 Higher secondary (12th std) & certificate course in
Medical Laboratory Technology
2 Krishna M 5 Graduate & Sanitary Inspector
3 Rajesh M 5 Higher secondary (12th std), diploma in Industrial
Technology & Sanitary Inspector
4 Prashant M 3 Masters in Social Work
5 Shailesh M 3 Graduate, Sanitary Inspector & was pursuing his
Masters in Social Work externally at the time of the
interview
6 Anand M 3 Graduate & Sanitary Inspector
7 Ganesh M 1.5 Higher secondary (12std) and Sanitary Inspector
8 Vivek M 1 Graduate (Lab Technician)
Global Public Health 7
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patients’ lives and life circumstances, the TB HVs also express ambivalence regarding the
rigidity of the DOT approach. Krishna admits that ‘some patients have too many
problems … in their case there should be flexibility. In these cases I feel it is alright even
if it is not DOT’.
Patients’ deference to the authority of the TB HV is tempered with faith. Interventions
with patients are often far-reaching and often described in moral terms. Krishna’s story
about Shankar, a Category I sputum positive patient, indicates the importance of building
relationships across family ties and formal contacts with the health system:
When he [Shankar] found out that he had TB and told his wife, she informed her natal family
and they immediately came to take her away. They said: ‘No, we won’t let her stay here with
you!’ He came to me and said: ‘Sir, it is like this. My wife is saying she wants to go back to
her native place and now what do I do? If my wife goes away who will feed me? […]So
please give me these medicines at my native place […]I said to him: ‘If you go to your native
place, will you have the facility for these medicines, investigations? What if something
happens? […]I will come to your house or you bring your family here, let us explain to them.
Let’s see if they listen’. He brought his family, his in-laws. I explained to them and clarified
whatever doubts they had. But even after I had explained, they were not satisfied. Then the
next day I asked them to come to the TU [TB Unit]. They came, we spoke with madam
[referring to Medical Officer in charge] […]When their doubts were clarified [Shankar’s]
wife stayed and he was completely cured. [Krishna, five years of experience]
Prashant maintains that ‘trust’ is central to convince patients to resume treatment, and
ultimately get ‘cured’:
The patient [who has to be re-treated] is nervous at that point. [He says] ‘I did not get cured
after taking so many tablets, I am going to die now’ …, that is generally the patient’s attitude
at this point. […]we counsel the patient. […]He is only 50% convinced. But he believes us,
trusts us. He has six months experience[…]‘Let’s do the [sputum] culture’. We tell him. ‘It
did not get cured but now you [also] have an injection [Streptomycin]. That might give
relief’. After two, three weeks his weight increases, appetite increases and because of that he
is convinced and then his self-confidence increases. He says: ‘I will be cured’ and he gets
cured. [Prashant, three years of experience]
The power of responsibility features strongly in vocational narratives. Prashant had the
choice of a better paying government job as an HIV counsellor, but became a TB HV,
justifying his preference by saying: ‘There we can only counsel a patient but not cure
him. Here we can cure the patient […]There is a lot of travelling, outdoor work involved
in this job, but I do not mind it’. Krishna describes the eventual recovery of an elderly TB
patient he followed, as a driving motivation for his work:
I repeatedly reassured him, he took his medicines diligently and I cured him. On the day his
final x-ray was taken – madam [Medical Officer] took a look at the x ray and told him ‘you
are cured’ … the elderly man fell at my feet. I was overwhelmed … in this life I may or may
not do anything else but I earned this satisfaction … I got the satisfaction that I saved a life.
Inter-organisational relationships: TB HVs and PPs
In addition to outreach work with patients, TB HVs in Sundernagar interact with PPs on a
regular basis. However, these interactions are inherently unequal, and TB HVs struggle to
gain respect as credible programme authorities. Whereas the TB HVs’ relationship with
patients is based in paternalism, allowing them to undertake actions ‘for the patient’s good’,
8 K. Kielmann et al.
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their relationship with PPs is ambivalent, as they are put in the awkward position of
exercising control over individuals they would normally be subservient towards.
Establishing rapport involves lengthy negotiation of hierarchy, knowledge and status.
TB HVs have to overcome tainted attitudes towards the public sector. Tales of gaining
respect from PPs describe rituals of submission: being forced to wait long hours outside
PPs’ clinics, told to come back numerous times, and occasionally having to endure
disrespect from ‘foul mouths’. Initial attempts to recruit PPs are also not always welcome.
Ganesh recalls:
One doctor hassled me so much, right until the end […] There would be one or two patients
in that sir’s clinic in one to two hours. [But] still he would dilly-dally. When I went in the
evening, he would say: ‘Don’t come at this time, it is time to light the lamps.6 Come in the
morning’. If I went in the morning, he would say: ‘Now, see here you are again…’ just like
that [dismissively]…One would get a feeling of being even below the level of a ward boy.
The non-medical status of the TB HVs often limits their interaction with the PPs,
especially those trained in allopathy, who hold an MBBS degree.7 DOT represents a de-
skilling for some allopathic practitioners, especially physicians who feel that their role is
reduced to filling out referral forms or observing patients take drugs. Prashant commented
that some doctors resist this shift in roles: ‘They will do an x-ray on their own or will get
sputum examined from somewhere else or will give their own treatment, give [patients]
tablets for a month and then refer them’. Anand, placed at a private tertiary care hospital,
said he had to ‘fight’ to convince PPs who start patients on ‘AKT’ [Anti-Koch’s (TB)
Treatment] that ‘our DOTS is also good’.
Krishna suggests that it is not only disagreement on treatment but professional
complicity that limits the involvement of allopathic PPs:
They hesitate … to get involved because they are either attached to some physician or they
have relations [a relationship] with some hospital. If they come across a patient with Koch’s
[TB], generally what they do is, they send him to a physician. Initially they get his x-ray, all
investigations done from outside [private] and then later if the patient cannot afford, only
then they refer to our [public] health system.
In contrast, non-allopathic doctors often see the linkage with the RNTCP as a way to
boost their legitimacy as clinicians, and an opportunity to upgrade their knowledge.
Prashant told us: ‘We find BAMS, BHMS [non-allopathic doctors]8 … much better than
the MBBS […]because they refer sincerely’.9
TB HVs struggle to establish a distinct professional identity for themselves. For some
PPs, TB HVs’ affiliation with the programme provides them with legitimate credentials,
as expressed by Vivek: ‘In some places we tell the receptionists or sisters [nurses]: “I am
from RNTCP. This is my card. I want to speak to sir in this context.”’ Yet in interviews
with PPs participating in the programme, confusion as to the underlying occupational
motive of the TB HVs was manifest: TB HVs were variously referred to as ‘TB person’,
‘social worker’, ‘multi-purpose worker’, ‘nurse’, ‘doctor’ and even ‘WHO consultant’.
Other PPs perceived the TB HV as a ‘public sector employee who is doing his job and
who keeps coming back’ (Prashant). While mistakenly identified as such, TB HVs do not
share the benefits of public sector employees. Krishna notes that although public sector
DOT providers are meant to look after patients ‘properly’, they rarely go to the ‘field’ to
follow up patients on DOT:
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They are permanent [employees of the municipal corporation] no one can do anything to
them […]Here, the municipal corporation is a local self-government…everyone’s father or
brother is a local politician.10 If the [senior programme] officer says anything, there would be
a phone call from the top [inquiring]: “why did you scold him?”
TB HVs have a particularly fine balancing act to play when using their position to both
defer to, and assume authority. This is most evident when it comes to monitoring PPs’
adherence to the ‘rules’ of PPM-DOTS. Routine exchanges with PPs are based on the
review of treatment cards and treatment boxes to verify patient’s regular attendance, yet
‘compliance’ of PPs with marking cards is low. Ganesh comments:
Some doctors never did the markings, we used to do them. Next week when we visited, we
would do that, so that there was nothing pending. We regularly remind them but still there
isn’t as much change as should have been.
In trying to convince PPs to do their job, TB HVs must appeal to the PPs’ sense of rank
rather than responsibility: ‘We told them: “Sir, we are pulled up by our seniors if these
are not completed.” Because we said this, they have started marking to a large extent’
(Shailesh).
Despite the inherent imbalance in the relationship between TB HVs and PPs, Prashant
suggests that sustained interaction with PPs promotes a more positive attitude towards the
public sector among PPs:
When they get involved in the programme, when we interact with them, and they come for a
meeting, they see our work, our record keeping etc. Then they are astonished […] They say:
‘I never thought that your programme would be like this or that there would be so much
transparency. But now I see that it is so.’ After that they change.
‘Routine’ visits of the TB HVs remain the most common mode of communication for PPs
with the programme. Over the course of many visits, TB HVs gain familiarity and
visibility. For many PPs, the TB HV’s visit provides an opportunity to follow up on
referred patients and refer new patients to the programme. TB HVs discuss individual
patients, their circumstances and any problems they have with taking the drugs with the
PPs. Common knowledge of patients helps to diffuse some of the rank differences
between TB HVs and PPs, providing a legitimate basis for shared expectations of care.
Organisational relationships: TB HV and supervisory structures
The programme is accountable for the outcome of every patient treated. This is done using
standard recording and reporting system, and the technique of ‘cohort analysis’. The cure rate
and other key indicators are monitored at every level of the health system, and if any area is
not meeting expectations, supervision is intensified. The RNTCP shifts the responsibility for
cure from the patient to the health system. [Central TB Division, Directorate General of
Health Services, 2010]
The PPM-DOTS and the engagement of TB HVs represent different mechanisms through
which the RNTCP seeks to strengthen its responsiveness to the ‘community’ of patient-
citizens, by making ‘DOTS services available and accessible even in the most remote
corners of India” (www.tbcindia.org) and meeting preferences for providers who are
“closer to and more trusted by patients’ (RNTCP, 2008). The programme discourse of
community accountability and citizen involvement is balanced, however, by a complex
10 K. Kielmann et al.
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internal ‘hierarchy of bureaucracies’ (Ambe et al., 2005, p. 563). Reporting and recording
systems for monitoring and evaluating outcomes of patients at every level of the health
system have entailed a shift from clinical to managerial responsibilities for many medical
doctors at TB centres (Fochsen, Deshpande, Ringsberg, & Thorson, 2009).
Supervision of TB HVs is rigorous as they represent the ‘face of the programme’
(current CTO) and are in daily contact with patients, with PPs and with the public sector
DOT centres. Reporting systems are complex, involving interactions with multiple levels
of supervisors. Work in the field is monitored through a field log of visits to PPs and
patients and duplicate cards maintained for patients receiving DOT from DOT provider
PPs. These records are reviewed by the MO TUs in the presence of the senior treatment
supervisors (STS) in daily meetings where:
the routine work that we do…is presented […] all that we did yesterday and how we did it,
the problems we had yesterday, how many interrupted patients there were or what other
problems there were – we bring all this to their notice’. (Krishna)
The relationship between the TB HVs and their immediate supervisors is complex in
nature. On the one hand, programme officers and supervisors rely on the TB HVs’ field-
based knowledge, asking their suggestions on how to increase detection rates in an area
or how best to provide health education. On the other hand, senior officers endorse a
fairly tight system of checks and balances. Flexibility in the TB HV’s work schedule is
limited. Both senior programme officers and STSs sometimes pay random and
unannounced visits to the PP-DOT centres to verify that TB HVs are following the pre-
planned schedule of visits, that treatment cards are correctly filled in, and that ‘retrieval
actions’ are undertaken for patients interrupting treatment. These random visits are seen
by the TB HVs as measures to prevent malingering. As a result, relationships between TB
HVs and supervisory staff can be strained. Ganesh, who was particularly unhappy with
the way his immediate supervisor treated him, commented: ‘There was no trust […] many
doctors asked me if I did not get along with the STS. They told me that the STS was
asking some strange questions like: “doesn’t Ganesh come?”’ Rajesh describes a general
lack of open communication between the TB HVs and their supervisors:
Instead of talking to us they [STSs] talk directly to the MO TU. They should talk to us first.
For example, there was a patient problem. We had paid a home visit…the patient’s relatives
were out for work during the day. When he [STS] went there he met the relatives. The
relatives say that no one had come to the house to speak to them. So he [STS] directly
informed the MO TU or CTO [without speaking to us]. [Rajesh, five years of experience]
While the daily review is held for each TU, weekly meetings are held to review
programme performance as a whole. These meetings are attended by all senior staff as
well as the TB HVs, and are presided over by the CTO. Reports on newly registered
patients and the status of registered patients are presented and the TB HVs’ field logs are
reviewed by the CTO. While these meetings present potential spaces where TB HVs can
officially voice their concerns about difficult cases, they are often hesitant to reveal
doubts, as their performance is ultimately evaluated through ‘cure rates’, which is the
proportion of new sputum positive patients in their assigned area who test sputum
negative at the end of treatment. The meetings follow hierarchical patterns in
communication, whereby individuals may be ‘singled out’ through praise, but more
likely through criticism or being issued a ‘memo’, an official note asking for a formal
explanation of a lapse in reporting. Rajesh suggests that ‘only certain people are subject
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to that. Meaning that one person will be made the target and only he will be harassed.
Every time, only his diary will be checked…repeatedly’. Shailesh adds wistfully: ‘If there
is a situation [problem], all of them [senior officers] reprimand us all the time… it’s ok…
but if there is a pat on the back from time to time, it would feel so much better’.
While TB HVs’ ability to convince patients to get back on treatment, or to persuade
PPs to work with the programme are based in their familiarity with patients and PPs, too
much familiarity is considered undesirable by senior officers, possibly compromising
monitoring relationships. In addition to supervisory visits and disciplinary memos, a more
serious measure to keep TB HVs in check is to reshuffle administrative areas handled by
each TB HV. Intended to avoid complacency resulting from working in a particular area
over an extended period of time, the transfer of staff causes upheaval in the work routines
of TB HVs and the relationships they have built up with patients and PPs. Rajesh bitterly
comments:
There was no need for the transfers and it feels like it was made to trouble someone. It results
in […] tension, mental stress. […]They say the detection rate, cure rate was good. Then what
was the reason for the transfers?
Although TB HVs are held accountable for the programme’s efforts to expand DOTS
through the PPM, they ultimately do not hold formal status or authority to challenge
decisions or make changes. Ganesh expressed a widely held frustration:
It is a one-way system with health workers. It is not that all improvements should be through
the health workers…the officers are at fault as well. But they are officers. We cannot tell
them directly to their faces. And they also are not ready [to take the criticism]. […]Because
of this, whatever they say, we have to nod ‘yes’ in front of them … It should not be like this.
We [also] have expectations from them.
Discussion
The health system is not simply a mechanical structure to deliver technical interventions the
way a post office delivers a letter. Rather, health systems are core social institutions. They
function at the interface between people and the structures of power that shape their broader
society. [Freedman, 2005, p. 20]
Relational concepts like ‘partnership’, ‘contract’ and ‘integration’ feature prominently in
the terminology of PPP, implicating different types of relationships and forms of
accountability across the public–private divide in health care (Birungi, Mugisha,
Nsabagasani, Okuonzi, & Jeppsoon, 2001; Blaauw et al., 2003; De Costa et al., 2008;
Fochsen et al., 2009). However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the ground-
level experiences of health workers tasked with implementing these initiatives. The PPM-
DOTS in Sundernagar is one example of a global health policy imperative that placed
new demands on frontline health workers as extensions of the formal health system.
As the research came to an end, the initiative had been in place for nearly 10 years,
with TB HVs actively involved since three years. When asked about the role of TB HVs
in the PPM, the senior programme officers had very different views. The former CTO
said rather dismissively that TB HVs were ‘only like postmen, keeping the boxes and
conveying the messages from the doctor, sending the report […] A TB HV is not a
technical person so cannot make any impact on [treatment] outcomes as such’. In
contrast, the current CTO enthusiastically described the TB HV as ‘the grass root workers
12 K. Kielmann et al.
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in this partnership’, reminding us that ‘this partnership depends on the TB HVs working
well with the doctors’.
While the former CTO focused on technical treatment outcomes as the ultimate aim of
the PPM, the current CTO valued the implications of creating good social relationships –
‘working well with the doctors’ – for soldering the PPM-DOTS. These perceptions do not
necessarily conflict. However, a focus on the former may obscure important mechanisms
through which low-level, frontline health workers like TB HVs contribute to partnerships
in the health system.
Our study focused on a small initiative undertaken by a local programme, one that
appears to be a deviant case in terms of its sustainability. The experiences of the eight TB
HV represented here are highly individual and subjective, and may not be generalisable
for the universe of frontline health workers involved in TB control. However, we drew on
the TB HVs accounts of their working lives and practices here not so much to comment
on their viability as effective agents in the PPM-DOTS, but rather to highlight the critical
importance of social and power relations in facilitating (or hindering) health systems’
goals of partnership and integration.
Adapting Newman’s (1998) framework of public sector relationships in the health
system, we suggest that the relationships described among the diverse actors engaged in
the PPM-DOTS are structured not only by the programme’s practices of clinical
governance, but also by social hierarchies that permeate the broader context of medical
pluralism in India. As in many other countries, the reality of pluralistic practice in India is
not represented by distinct, independent health care traditions, but rather by more
‘porous’ boundaries where ‘many types of providers operate and markets for almost all
medical goods and services have emerged in a largely unregulated way’ (Bloom &
Standing, 2008, p. 2069). In this context, partnerships such as that represented by PPM-
DOTS are not just institutional arrangements but rather, sets of interactions among a
broad range of actors who have different sources of legitimacy, power and willingness to
contribute towards a shared goal. Changes to systems of governance – as are subtly
introduced through the intervention of TB HVs in the PPM-DOTS – ‘invariably affect the
distribution of power between various actors, they determine the systems and structures
through which accountability is supposed to operate, and they reflect different levels of
trust’ (Rowe & Calnan 2006, p. 379).
Convinced that DOTS is an appropriate way of demonstrating ‘care’ for TB patients,
TB HVs assume a sense of civic duty in protecting the ‘greater good’ as public health
workers. At the same time, they actively intervene in patients’ lives based on their
familial proximity and derive satisfaction in knowing they have contributed towards the
‘cure’ of individual patients. This is experienced by health worker cadres positioned
between programmes and individual medical practitioners across diverse settings.
Justice’s (1983) seminal study on the role of the peon in Nepal’s health system points
to the paradox of the ‘invisible’ government clerk who assumes critical health care tasks
for patients who cannot access the system. Brownlie and Howson (2006) describe health
visitors participating in immunisation programmes in the UK, who respond to
‘centralized information’ in conflicting ways, both ‘delivering the “normalizing
judgments” essential to governmentality’ (p. 439) and establishing relationships with
clients that enable the provision of valuable information. In the Indian setting, ‘conflicting
accountabilities’ have been described for doctors struggling to balance the requirements
of DOTS with the needs of patients and their relatives (Fochsen et al., 2009). In our study,
TB HVs’ relationships with patients are framed not only through RNTCP directives, but
through a prevailing culture of paternalism that assumes patients – especially if less
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educated, younger or female – have limited awareness or agency in health-related
decision-making (Datye et al., 2006; Fochsen, Deshpande, & Thorson, 2006; Kielmann
et al., 2005).
In relationships with PPs, TB HVs oscillate between towing and breaking rank to
fulfil both programme directives and practitioners’ professional interests. Building
working relations with PPs entail rites of passage that are shaped by the context of
pluralistic practice, in which different medical traditions compete for patients and
reputation (Khare, 1996; Kielmann et al., 2005; Nichter, 2002). The TB HVs are able to
gain a certain complicity with PPs through shared knowledge of patients and liminal
status as health providers. Both TB HVs and PPs experience patients’ life circumstances
at first hand, expressing the need to adapt DOTS to meet the needs of vulnerable patients
(Khan, Walley, Witter, Shah, & Javeed, 2005). Ironically, in the public health literature,
these views and practices represent ‘conflicting perceptions’ – barriers to PPM-DOTS and
the target orientation of the RNTCP (De Costa et al., 2008; Vyas et al., 2003).
Yet the relationship between TB HVs and PPs is precarious, as the TB HVs have to
show up PPs’ ‘bending the rules’ for individual patients as well as their lapses in
reporting duties. Relationships with supervisors are inherently tense as a result of the
need to meet targets, which serve to ‘align managerial and clinical rationalities’ (Flynn,
2002, p. 164). In a quasi-Kafkaesque division of labour, programme supervisors monitor
TB HVs, who monitor the PP-DOT providers, who monitor the patients. As described
elsewhere (Brownlie & Howson, 2006; George, 2009; Harrison & Dowswell, 2002;
Murphy, 2003), this mechanism of ‘bureaucratic compliance’ (George, 2009) appears to
confer an important role for health workers in a hierarchical, multi-layered ‘field’ context
but ‘restricts their capacity to exercise any real professional judgement in an expanded
public health role’ (Brownlie & Howson, 2006, p. 441).
Successful integration of PPM-DOTS into the public health system has remained
elusive (Mahendradhata et al., 2007), in part because efforts to implement ‘partnerships’
often fail to take account of working relations among significant actors on the ground
(Birungi et al., 2001). Previous work on PPM-DOTS in India has noted the importance of
communication and ‘interaction at the individual level’ to build trust between programme
staff and PPs who are unequal ‘partners’ (Ambe et al., 2005). Trust is more generally seen
as an effective and ethical way of ‘framing’ health systems relationships (Gilson 2003),
yet trust is strongly shaped by cultural norms that govern the form and content of
relationships across gender, age, occupation and other relevant social divisions.
Professional and social identity are closely allied; health workers who are ‘respected
for their skills and access to resources […] are expected to use these important relations
of social reciprocity’ (Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003, p. 330). However, the role of frontline
health workers like TB HVs in soldering key health systems relationships remains
undervalued (Justice, 1983; Manongi, Marchant, & Bygbyerg, 2006; Mathauer &
Imhoff, 2006).
Conclusion
As multi-drug resistant TB emerges as a major threat in India, both community-based
frontline health workers as well as the private sector have become the focus of renewed
efforts to revive PPM-DOTS for management and control of TB. Our insights from
Sundernagar suggest the need for public sector staff to increase efforts to build and
sustain relationships with the private sector in order to enable viable ‘partnerships’ that
can contribute to improving outcomes for TB patients. As hidden links in the PPM-DOTS
14 K. Kielmann et al.
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chain, TB HVs need formal acknowledgement, supportive supervision and the oppor-
tunity to acquire new skills. If officially recognised and respected as ‘partners’, TB HVs
might take on more active roles in identifying commonly recurring problems, initiating
change processes and evaluating improvements in the programme (Béhague, Kanhonou,
Filippi, Lègonou, & Ronsman, 2008; Dieleman, Gerretsen, & Jan van der Wilt, 2009).
This is especially relevant given their proximity and close attention to the multiple layers
and forms of accountability in the PPM-DOTS. As George (2009) argues, the
external accountability of public health programmes ‘cannot be realised in the absence
of internal accountability between health administrators and workers’ (p. 209). In order
for accountability mechanisms to effectively mediate relationships between the different
and inherently unequal sets of actors involved in PPM, they need perhaps to change the
‘terms of engagement’ and ‘transform them in legitimising ways’ (George, 2003, p. 11).
While generic recommendations for improving accountability need to be translated
into dynamic processes that closely follow the logic of local practices and actors (George,
2003), it is worth taking note of the limiting parameters of context specificity:
‘partnerships’ such as that represented by the Sundernagar PPM-DOTS are both enabled
and constrained by the wider cultures of pluralism, social hierarchy and paternalism that
pervade working relationships in the Indian health system. In this environment, TB HVs’
daily adjustments of professional and personal ethic constitute balancing acts in the
divide between public and private health goals.
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Notes
1. The Department of Indian Systems of Medicine and Homeopathy (ISM&H) was created in
March 1995 and re-named as the Department of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unnani,
Siddha and Homeopathy (AYUSH) in November 2003 with a view to providing focused
attention to the development of Education & Research in Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy,
Unnani, Siddha and Homeopathy systems.
2. Under the RNTCP, one TB HV serves a population of 100,000.
3. General practitioners, general physicians or chest physicians were included in the study while a
total of 92 specialists namely surgeons, dermatologists and dentists who rarely saw TB patients
were excluded. Out of the 675 PPs found eligible for the survey, pre-test interviews were
conducted with 46 PPs, 6 paediatricians were excluded as they did not see any adult patients,
41 PPs refused to participate, 16 PPs were unavailable, 45 PPs had closed their clinics since the
census and 17 PPs could not be located. Out of the 504 PPs surveyed, seven interviews were
discarded due to poor quality.
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4. One TB HV refused the interview and two were excluded as they were newly recruited and
lacked experience.
5. Module for multi-purpose workers and other DOT providers, June 2005.
6. Lamps are traditionally lit at dusk, considered an auspicious period for business and prosperity.
Businessmen discourage those seeking alms at this time, since ‘giving’ at this hour symbolises
giving away wealth from the establishment.
7. MBBS stands for ‘Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery’. In India, it is the first
qualifying degree for a physician trained in biomedicine.
8. BHMS stands for Bachelor of Homeopathic Medicine and Surgery, BAMS refers to Bachelor
of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery. Ayurveda is an indigenous tradition, while homeopathy is
an ‘imported’ tradition, however, both are included within the five medical traditions
contributing to the national health system.
9. Of the total PPs surveyed (n = 497), 88% were non-allopaths. The overwhelming majority of
the PP-DOT providers (n = 150/164) were non-allopaths.
10. This is figuratively taken to imply the use of political clout to forgo accountability.
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